Abstract. Smooth projective hash functions have been used as building block for various cryptographic applications, in particular for passwordbased authentication.
Introduction
Smooth projective hashing allows to compute the hash value of an element from a set in two different ways: either by using a secret hashing key on the element, or utilising the public projection key and some secret information proving that the particular element is part of a specific subset under consideration. In addition, smooth projective hash values guarantee to be uniformly distributed in their domain as long as the input element is not from a specific subset of the input set. These features make them a quite popular building block in many protocols such as CCA-secure public key encryption, blind signatures, password authenticated key exchange, oblivious transfer, zero-knowledge proofs, commitments and verifiable encryption.
Smooth projective hash functions (SPHF) are due to Cramer and Shoup [10] who used them to construct CCA-secure public key encryption schemes and analyse mechanisms from [9] . The first use of SPHFs in the construction of a password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol is due to Gennaro and Lindell [11] , who introduced additional requirements to the SPHF such as pseudorandomness that was later extended in [15] . The SPHF-based approach taken in [11] was further helpful in the "explanation" of the KOY protocol from [14] , where those functions were implicitly applied. Abdalla et al. [1] introduced conjunction and disjunction of languages for smooth projective hashing that were later used in the construction of blind signatures [7, 5] , oblivious signature-based envelopes [7] , and authenticated key exchange protocols for algebraic languages [4] . Blazy et al. [7] demonstrate more general use of smooth projective hashing in designing round-optimal privacypreserving interactive protocols.
We extend this line of work by considering divergent parametrised languages in one smooth projective hash function that allows multiple parties to jointly evaluate the result of the function. We propose the notion of (distributed) extended smooth projective hashing that enables joint hash computation for special languages. Further, we propose a new two-server password authenticated key exchange framework using the new notion of distributed smooth projective hashing and show how it helps to explain the protocol from [13] . Actually, the authors of [2] already built a group PAKE protocol using smooth projective hashing in a multi-party party protocol. However, they assume a ring structure such that the smooth projective hashing is only used between two parties.
Organisation. We start by recalling smooth projective hash functions and introduce useful definitions in Section 2. Our first contribution is the definition of an extended smooth projective hash function SPHF x that handles divergent parametrised languages in Section 3. Then we show how to distribute their computation between multiple parties, introducing distributed SPHF x in Section 3.1 and give a concrete instantiation in Section 3.3. Finally, we propose a two-server PAKE framework in Section 4 and analyse the two-server KOY protocol using a variant of distributed SPHF x in Section 4.2.
Smooth Projective Hash Functions
First, we recall definitions from [5] for classical SPHF with some minor changes. We stick with the framework from [5, Section 3] on cyclic groups G of prime order and focus on languages of ciphertexts. This seems reasonable since it is the preferred setting and allows a comprehensible description. An extension to graded rings and general languages should be possible and is left open for future work. A language L aux is indexed by a parameter aux, consisting of global public information and secret variable information aux . In our setting of languages of ciphertexts the public part of aux is essentially a common reference string crs containing the public key pk of the used encryption scheme. The secret part aux contains the message that should be encrypted. By π we denote the crs trapdoor, the secret key to pk. We denote L the encryption scheme used to generate words. Unless stated otherwise we assume that L is a labelled CCA-secure encryption scheme.
